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In the perspective of a successful exit from the recent global crisis, the debate on the long-
term programmes of structural reforms in the EU countries has gradually revived. 
However, similarly to the pre-crisis experience, the path of structural reforms 
continues to appear fraught with difficulties. On the basis of the extensive literature 
grounded on the political economy and public choice approaches,  this paper analyses why 
the decision-making process of structural reforms is usually very difficult even though they 
lead to a more efficient allocation of resources and boost long-run growth. Finally, the 
paper points out how the progress of a country’s structural reforms may be strongly 
influenced by political, institutional and economic factors contributing to define the 
framework in which policy makers interact with the national community in its various forms, 
the lobbies and more in general the organized special interest groups.  
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A broad and soul-searching debate has developed, notably since the 1990s, on the 
causes of the European Union (EU)’s scant economic dynamism in recent decades 
and the most appropriate measures to improve the outlook for the area’s growth. In 
this period, as is well known, the EU has recorded a significant slowdown in growth 
not only with respect to the past but also in comparison with the other advanced 
countries, especially the United States. 
According to the prevailing interpretations, the poor performance of the European 
economy is largely due to widespread structural shortcomings. Consistently with this 
line of interpretation, the various member countries have been encouraged to 
undertake and have undertaken, with great difficulty and varying degrees of success, 
wide-ranging reform programmes aimed at removing these shortcomings and 
thereby improve such variables as production, employment and productivity. In 
many cases, at both Community and national level, the corrective structural 
measures were set within the framework of the so-called Lisbon Strategy, which was 
launched in 2000 and, after an extremely disappointing start, re-launched in 2005. 
The major financial and economic crisis that in 2008 hit Europe and in particular 
the euro area gave rise, as in most of the Organization for Economic Cooperation 
and Development (OECD) countries, to a rapid and large fall in economic activity in 
the area. In such circumstances to stabilize the financial markets and at the same 
time to support production and employment were the priority of EU governments, 
compared with the longer term objective of overcoming the structural weaknesses 
that continued to characterize member countries and diminish the outlook for 
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growth. The anti-crisis programmes put in place often accompanied highly expansive 
monetary and fiscal policy measures with robust support for the banking system in 
the form of government injections of capital and guarantees of various kinds 
(European Commission, 2012, in particular pp. 27-42). Substantial State aid was also 
granted, in various forms, to other economic sectors. 
In the second half of 2009 and the first half of 2010 there were some encouraging 
signs that pointed to an inversion of the economic cycle. In a forecasting scenario 
that subsequently proved over-optimistic about the imminent exit from the crisis, 
there was a gradual revival of interest within the EU in longer-term problems. Both 
the European Commission and the main international economic organizations 
repeatedly stressed the need for Europe to re-embark without delay on the arduous 
path of structural reforms, which, as a consequence of the emergencies deriving from 
the unfavourable cyclical phase, had suffered a slowdown, if not come to a complete 
halt. An important pointer to the guidelines formulated by the European Commission 
for overcoming the crisis and reviving growth is provided by the document “Europe 
2020” published in 2010. Among other things it contains some interesting solutions 
for overcoming the serious weaknesses that emerged in the implementation of the 
Lisbon Strategy, although there are important elements of continuity with this 
document (Sestito and Torrini, 2012, pp. 18-21).1 
However, as in the pre-crisis experience, the path of structural reforms continues 
to appear fraught with difficulties also in relation to the post-crisis scenario. This 
paper focuses on the origins of such difficulties. The next section analyses the factors 
                                           
1 On the limits and difficulties encountered in applying the Lisbon Strategy, especially in the initial 
phase, see Tabellini and Wyplosz (2004) and ECB (2005). 
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that − in the light of a firmly established literature − are often likely to be stubborn 
obstacles to the political feasibility of the structural measures needed to stimulate 
Europe’s long-run growth potential. The third section shows how the incentive for 
policy makers to persist with reforms and their ability to overcome the resistance of 
interest groups are influenced by a whole range of variables, mostly unalterable in 
the short term, that define the political, institutional and economic reference setting. 
The last section concludes. The last section concludes. 
 
2. The Obstacles to the Political Feasibility of Structural Measures: A Review 
Although academics, economic agents and policy makers recognize the potential 
benefits, in terms of efficiency and economic growth, that could come from rapid 
and incisive measures to eliminate the structural weaknesses still widespread within 
the EU, the implementation of such measures continues to be fraught with problems. 
An extensive, firmly established literature grounded in the political economy and 
public choice approaches has illuminated several recurring causes of a general nature 
that help to explain the powerful resistance that often arises within policy-making 
processes, impeding or delaying the implementation of structural reforms even when 
they are advantageous from the perspective of social welfare. A thorough knowledge 
of these causes is a pre-requisite for the shaping of the strategies best able to enhance 
the chances of success of policies aimed at boosting potential economic growth in 
Europe. 
Among the factors delaying the implementation of structural policies, uncertainty 
about what their substance should be in practice is often cited. In fact, even when 
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there is a very broad consensus on the need for public action in certain areas of the 
economy in order to improve its growth prospects, incomplete understanding of the 
workings of the economy and thus imperfect knowledge of the foreseeable effects of 
the various types of measures can make it very difficult for policy makers to agree 
on the necessary package of specific measures (Sachs, 1994; Rodrik, 1996; Drazen, 
1998; Freytag and Renaud, 2007). In this context, a major obstacle can be 
disagreement between those who adhere to theoretical approaches that give the 
public authorities vast discretion in using both direct and indirect instruments to steer 
the economy in the desired direction and those who advocate setting strict limits on 
the battery of tools available to the government and on the way they can be used, 
whose greatest fear is that the negative consequences of regulatory action will do 
excessive harm to the market mechanisms. 
Another well-known and particularly important obstacle to the political feasibility 
of structural reforms stems from the fact that their benefits are mostly deferred 
whereas their costs are concentrated in the short term.2 This is the case, for example, 
of some product- and labour-market reforms whose positive effects on a country’s 
growth rate tend to materialize mainly in the long run but which in the short run can 
adversely affect both production and employment (IMF, 2004, pp.124-128). The 
more deferred are the benefits, the more a community, which discounts the future at 
high rates, will tend to disregard them, refusing to give political support to the 
adoption of a reform whose short-term costs are, instead, fully perceptible by its 
members. Temporal mismatching of the benefits and costs of structural measures can 
                                           
2 Situations in which the difference between the distribution over time of the costs and benefits of a 
reform results in the former initially outweighing the latter, which more than offset them in the longer 
run, can be depicted by a ‘J curve’ (Pinẽra, 1994, pp. 227-228). 
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therefore set a stringent constraint on policy makers’ room for manoeuvre, 
determining a status quo unfavourable to reforms. Added to this, policy makers tend 
to behave in ways intended more to serve their personal self-interest than to 
maximize some social welfare function. Opportunistic choices, aimed at increasing 
their chances of re-election, result in their preferring a short time horizon for 
evaluating the costs and benefits of economic policy actions and putting off reforms 
whose positive impact on social welfare ripens too late for them to benefit in terms 
of electoral support. This is borne out by empirical evidence showing that 
governments usually introduce structural reforms soon after being voted into office 
(OECD, 2007, pp. 171-172; OECD, 2009b, pp. 36-37). This argument is especially 
valid for countries whose electoral cycles are characterized by pronounced instability 
and short-lived governments. 
Obstinate resistance can also arise when the benefits and costs of reforms are 
unevenly distributed among the different components of a national community. 
Specifically, in addition to being deferred, the benefits in terms of overall efficiency 
are usually spread among large swathes of the population but are modest for the 
single individual, whereas the costs often fall on a fairly small number of persons, 
with a considerable burden for each of them. An example is offered by policies to 
open protected markets to competition, where a large group of potential winners, 
consumers, contrasts with a small number of potential losers, the producers that 
operate in those markets, who see their rent positions threatened. Since the structural 
measures entail costs borne by a limited number of persons, the latter have a strong 
incentive to unite, forming pressure groups to fight their passage. Not infrequently, 
the action of these groups defending particular interests leads to opportunistic 
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choices on the part of policy makers, to the detriment of the goals of efficiency and 
growth. On the other hand, the high degree of dispersion of the benefits, together 
with the transaction costs connected with the activity of organizing, which tends to 
grow for more numerous interest groups, reduces the individual incentive for the 
many potential beneficiaries to unite in support of the implementation of the 
measures (Olson, 1965). In this asymmetry between interest groups composed of a 
modest number of members and numerically larger ones in terms of their ability to 
organize on behalf of a common objective, we have another factor that contributes to 
the status quo prevailing at the expense of structural reforms.3 
An orientation in favour of the status quo, one that penalizes reforms, can be 
reinforced when public opinion is poorly informed about the actual size of the net 
benefits and their distribution over time. In particular, the benefits of structural 
reforms are less visible and amenable to assessment than are their costs, since they 
are often indirect, materialize mainly in the longer-term and are spread over large 
sectors of society, with a modest impact on each of its members. This contributes to 
voters underestimating the benefits of reforms.4 An effort by the governmental 
authorities to make the public better informed about the social costs of the status quo 
and the actual net benefits of a reform can help to create a pro-reform consensus 
(OECD, 2009b, pp. 9 and 49-51). 
A political and social climate hostile to a programme of reforms can also arise as 
a consequence of pervasive uncertainty not so much about the size of the benefits 
                                           
3 For a detailed analysis of a set of situations in which the action of pressure groups defending a 
shared interest of a limited number of persons leads to inefficient policy choices that penalize the 
growth rate of a country, see Olson (1983, particularly pp. 16-24). 
4“Most often it is mismatch ... between the real or perceived costs and benefits of reforms that 
generates opposition to them” (OECD, 2007, p. 171).  
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and costs but as to the identity of those who will ultimately be helped or harmed. As 
Fernandez and Rodrik (1991) have shown, in such circumstances an electorate 
composed of rational individuals may be induced to reject a reform process even if it 
is well aware that reform would be advantageous for the economy as a whole and 
that the majority of voters would get a net benefit. A situation of this kind can arise 
when, alongside those who think they know with certainty whether or not they will 
be among the beneficiaries, there is a sufficiently large percentage of individuals 
who are not in a position to predict whether they will be losers or winners. It is worth 
stressing that Fernandez and Rodrik develop their analysis assuming risk-neutral 
individuals. Their conclusions would be strengthened, however, under the 
assumption of risk-averse individuals. As Rodrik (1996, p. 38) underlines, situations 
where the lack of consensus in favour of a reform that would nevertheless benefit the 
majority of individuals stems from the difficulty of identifying in advance, with 
certainty, the position of winners or losers of an appreciable portion of the electorate 
can explain the survival of structural measures originally introduced by authoritarian 
regimes, against the prevailing will of public opinion, even after the return to 
democracy. 
From what has been said so far, it follows that structural measures aimed at 
eliminating inefficiencies and improving a country’s growth prospects in the longer 
run are almost never distributionally neutral. This is often the root of the strong 
resistance to them within society. In theory, a way to counter this resistance is to 
eliminate the distributional obstacle by devising adequate mechanisms to 
compensate for the losses of those who will be hurt by the implementation of the 
proposed reforms. In practice, however, the ‘compensation principle’ encounters 
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appreciable limitations: the compensating measures, for example, may be very costly 
and thus impracticable, especially for countries wrestling with budget adjustment 
and excessive public debt. Such measures, moreover, may be hard to manage and 
promise uncertain results, owing to the difficulty of identifying the losers and 
quantifying the loss to be indemnified (IMF, 2004, p. 109; OECD, 2009b, pp.54-
60).5 And the payment of compensation can be complicated by opportunistic 
behaviour on the part of the potential recipients. In certain circumstances, the 
efficacy of the ‘compensation principle’ as an instrument for weakening the 
resistance of organized pressure groups and gaining the consent of the electorate can 
be vitiated by time-inconsistency and credibility problems with regard to 
governments’ commitment to delivering compensation once the reform is in place 
(Rodrik, 1996, p. 38).  
It should be pointed out that the ‘compensation principle’ does not necessarily 
entail financial transfers to the “losers” but can take other forms, including the joint 
adoption of a set of reforms: those harmed by a structural measure in one sector can 
be compensated in whole or in part with the benefits accruing to them from the 
simultaneous adoption of another measure in a different sector. An example is a 
package of measures based on the principles of flexicurity, where the disadvantages 
for workers deriving from the introduction of more flexible contracts are coupled 
                                           
5 On the unfeasibility of strictly applying the ‘compensation principle’ and the advisability of 
resorting to pragmatic solutions, Olson (1983, p. 46) writes: “This method is more difficult, even 
impossible, to apply when the losers or the sizes of their losses aren’t readily calculable, and it is 
accordingly impossible in practice to compensate every one of the losers fully, so unanimity cannot be 
obtained. Yet as a practical matter, existing democratic governments require little more than majority 
approval rather than unanimity to make changes, so imaginative if rough-and-ready proposals that buy 
off the main groups that would lose from reform can often pass despite scattered opposition”. 
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with and counterbalanced by measures to provide more support for unemployment 
and more effective active labour policies.6 
With reference to the joint implementation of two or more reforms, the 
sequencing of such reforms may be important. For example, it has been shown that 
the short-term impact of certain reforms on the labour market – which is likely to be 
negative, if they are introduced  in isolation – may be mitigated if they are preceded 
by reforms that liberalize the markets for goods, by lowering the barriers to new 
firms’ entry and, more generally, guaranteeing more competition (Blanchard and 
Giavazzi, 2003; Estevão, 2005).   
 The political sustainability of a reform process can also be facilitated by phasing 
in the programme of structural interventions gradually, over a transitional period 
long enough to allow their negative impact on the group of potential losers to be 
circumscribed. Strategies for the at least partial compensation of potential losers 
based on reforms that provide for long phase-in periods and/or exemption of certain 
groups have been implemented in various European countries in the social security 
sector and the labour market Nevertheless, it should be pointed out that a strategy of 
this kind is exposed to various risks (OECD, 2009b, pp. 56-58). 
 
3. The influence of the Political, Institutional and Economic Context on the 
Progress of Structural Reforms 
In the preceding pages it has been shown that the progress of structural reforms 
within a country is determined by the interaction between policy makers and the 
                                           
6 On the trade-off in the labour market between protecting jobs and providing support for 
unemployment and on the consequent scope for policy makers to take joint measures in these two 
fields as part of a strategy of compensation, see Boeri, Conde-Ruiz and Galasso (2012). 
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national community in its various expressions, lobbies and more in general organized 
special interest groups. At this point it should be emphasized that a government’s 
determination and ability to overcome the various kinds of opposition to the 
structural measures necessary for growth are powerfully influenced by the specific 
institutional, political and economic context in which it must act. In many cases this 
explains the different pace and effectiveness of reform policies in the individual 
European countries in recent years. Many of the variables defining that context are 
not within the power of national policy makers to control and thus to modify, at least 
in the short term. 
Among the political and institutional variables able to influence reform 
programmes’ likelihood of success, the literature has often focused on whether the 
system of government is presidential or parliamentary and the electoral system 
proportional or majoritarian. Another important variable identified is the electoral 
cycle. As noted earlier, elected officials usually have a greater incentive to adopt 
reforms in the early part of their term of office. Also, governments’ commitment to 
reforms tends to diminish in a setting of acute political instability and short-lived 
administrations.  
As to the economic variables that can influence the ability of governments to 
undertake reform policies and carry them to completion, various empirical studies 
have shown that situations of prolonged low or negative growth can increase 
political support for structural adjustment programmes. One possible explanation is 
that the protraction of an economic crisis makes society more conscious of the costs 
of not embarking on reforms and at the same time weakens the opposition of interest 
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groups.7 Another important economic variable that can assist the progress of 
structural reforms is the sustainability of the public finances in the longer term. With 
reference to the positive correlation often found between the soundness of countries’ 
public finances and their ability to implement structural reforms, it has been noted  
that although weak public finances and international constraints on the budgetary 
measures are likely to exert pressure in favour of reforms, they may also make them 
more difficult to implement owing to the costs those reforms impose in the 
immediate (OECD, 2009b, pp. 40-42). In other words, when the public accounts are 
in order, governments have more scope to undertake growth policies that put a 
burden on the budget in the short term. 8  
Evaluating the influence exerted by international rather than domestic factors on 
the dynamics of structural reforms in a country is an especially complex matter. 
They can work their influence through various channels (IMF, 2003, pp. 102-104; 
IMF, 2004, pp. 112-113 and pp. 130-132; OECD, 2007, p. 175). A first channel 
consists in the economy’s external openness. Lags with respect to the “rest of the 
world” in adopting the structural interventions needed to stimulate productivity and 
efficiency gains adversely affect a country’s international competitiveness and hence 
its ability to export goods and attract foreign direct investment, with negative effects 
on its domestic economic performance. The hope of avoiding these costs, whose 
                                           
7 However, there are also examples of opposite sign with regard to the relationship between economic 
crises and the political sustainability of structural reforms. On this issue, see Rodrik (1996, pp. 26-29, 
and the references cited therein), IMF (2004, p. 113-114), OECD (2007, p. 171), OECD (2009a, p. 
38) and OECD (2009b, p. 40).  
8 Helpful observations on the relationship between the state of the public finances and structural 
reforms are published in Buti, Röger and Turrini (2009). In this work, which contains three decades of 
empirical data on fifteen EU countries, it is suggested that the time horizon of policy makers’ choices 
may be an important factor in causing policies oriented towards fiscal rigorousness and structural 
reforms to be linked by a relationship of complementarity or substitutability. 
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impact is considerable in a setting of closely integrated economies, gives policy 
makers a stronger incentive to accelerate the pace of structural reforms in their own 
country by resisting the pressure of special interest groups that fear they stand to lose 
from an abandonment of the status quo. 
Public opinion can be swayed in favour of structural corrective measures not only 
by fear of a loss of international competitiveness but also by the success, in terms of 
economic growth and employment, enjoyed by other countries that took similar 
initiatives earlier. This ‘imitation effect’ can be considerable in countries belonging 
to the same regional area and having highly interdependent domestic economies. 
International agreements are another important channel through which the 
external environment can influence the propensity of a country to proceed with 
reforms. One can cite a large number of instances of governments adopting structural 
measures, above all regarding the goods and financial markets, because of the need 
to honour commitments made within international organizations at regional level, 
e.g. the EU and the North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA), or at global level, 
e.g. the IMF and the World Trade Organization (WTO).9 The strategy of “tying 
one’s hands” by adhering to a programme of structural interventions under an 
international agreement may be a way for a country’s policy makers to overcome 
problems of credibility and time inconsistency. In particular, stakeholders’ 
awareness that infringement of the international agreement would expose the country 
to costly economic sanctions helps to render the government’s commitment to 
                                           
9 A much-discussed issue in this field is the relationship between international aid and the dynamics 
of structural reforms in a country. With specific reference to the IMF’s activity of providing financial 
assistance, a highly controversial question concerns the effectiveness of so-called structural 
conditionality, usually associated with the granting of loans, as a means of bringing pressure to bear 
on the governments of beneficiary countries to promote the reforms necessary to launch lasting 
processes of economic growth and poverty reduction. 
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reform credible, with the result, among other things, of discouraging the activity of 
lobbies opposed to the reforms. 
4. Conclusions 
In the wait of a successful exit from the recent crisis, an extensive debate concerning 
the long-term programmes of structural reforms in the EU countries has gradually 
revived. However, similarly to the pre-crisis experience, the path of structural 
reforms is still fraught with difficulties. A thorough knowledge of such difficulties is 
a pre-requisite for the shaping of the strategies best able to enhance the chances of 
success of policies aimed at boosting potential economic growth in Europe.  
Drawing on a considerable body of literature largely based on the political 
economy and public choice approaches, this paper has surveyed the chief general 
causes of the strong resistance to structural reforms that quite often arises within the 
political decision-making process and impedes or delays their implementation even 
when they are beneficial for social welfare.  
The final part of the paper pointed out how the progress of structural reforms in a 
country can be strongly influenced by a constellation of political, institutional and 
economic factors that determine the framework in which policy makers interact with 
the national community in its various expressions, lobbies and more in general 
organized special interest groups. Many of the variables defining that context are 
beyond the reach of  national policy makers and  thus hardly modifiable, at least in 
the short term. 
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